For nearly seven decades, the defense-industrial complex of the Soviet Union went toe-to-toe with the best firms that the West had to offer.
In some cases, it surprised the West with cheap, innovative, effective systems. In others, it could barely manage to put together aircraft that could remain in the air, and ships that could stay at sea.
No single weapon could have saved the Soviet Union, but several might have shifted the contours of its collapse. The relationship between technology and the “human” elements of war, including doctrine and organization, is complex. Decisions about isolated systems can have far reaching implications for how a nation defends itself.
Weapons are often cancelled for good reason. Events intercede in ways that focus a nation’s attention on its true interests and needs, rather than on the pursuit of glory and prestige. In the Soviet case, many of the “wonder weapons” remained safely in the realm of imagination, both for the enemies of the USSR, and the USSR itself.
‘Sovetsky Soyuz’ class battleship
During the interwar period, the Soviet Union explored a variety of options for revitalizing its decrepit fleet. Until the first decade of the 20th century, the czars had maintained a relatively modern, powerful navy.
After the Russo-Japanese War, however, Russian shipbuilding fell steadily behind the West, and the revolution disrupted both the industry and the navy itself.
By the late 1930s, the Soviet economy had recovered to the point that Stalin could seriously consider a program of naval construction. The Sovetsky Soyuz-class battleships spearheaded an ambitious acquisition plan, which also included battlecruisers and aircraft carriers.
Based loosely on the Italian Littorio class, the Sovetsky Soyuzs would displace approximately 60,000 tons, carry nine 16-inch guns, and make 28 knots.
This made them competitive in size with the most powerful battleships in the world, although inexperience and shoddy Soviet construction practice would likely have rendered them troublesome in battle.
The Soviet Union laid down four of the intended 16 battleships between 1938 and 1940, parceling out construction between Leningrad, Nikolayev (on the Black Sea) and Molotovsk (on the White Sea). One was cancelled in 1940 because of poor workmanship.
The other three were suspended on the arrival of war, although plans proceeded to complete one (in Leningrad) even after World War II ended. Wiser heads eventually prevailed, and the ships were broken up in place.
Construction of the ships required an enormous investment of Soviet state resources. Had construction begun earlier, the USSR would have wasted a fair chunk of national income on three ships that could not escape the Baltic and the Black Sea, respectively, and one that would have been limited to convoy escort in the Arctic.
Literally any use of materials and industrial capacity would have served the USSR better in war than these four ships.
It would be so nice if there were never any weapons of war ever needed, either good weapons or the flops, but testosterone and ego’s seems to require it.
Reblogged this on Truth Troubles: Why people hate the truths' of the real world.
No my friend it is neither testosterone or ego, most of the time as Clausewitz said “War is Politics by other means…”
I can tell firsthand that the War is terrible and should be avoided at all cost, but sometimes it is necessary.