By Hammerhead
My last post about the Benghazi disaster was 2 years ago and there is good reason for that. This is a very sore subject for me and one I really cannot discuss without getting EXTREMELY pissed off. This is also the reason I decided to not see the movie 13 Hours when it came out the first of this year, even though several friends told me it was decent and I was invited no less than three times to go see it.
So against my better judgement, I decided to go ahead and watch the movie Online today. After a very long cooling off period, and some prayer, Here are my thoughts.
“Does it seem like everybody else knows whats going on around here but us?”
Before I get into specifics, This quote from Tanto, one of the GRS Operators about halfway through the movie, really sums up the colossal goat rodeo that was the Benghazi disaster and sets the overall tone for understanding THE CHAOS ON THE GROUND THAT NIGHT.
You see folks for us to really understand this event and be subjective, we have to, at least for the time being, set aside our anger at the colossal failures of the State Department, The CIA, The White House and The Pentagon for a moment and just focus on what exactly was going on the ground prior too and during the actual attacks on the Diplomatic Compound and the CIA Annex.
I have identified Three Things from both the book and the movie I want to bring to your attention that I think will help us understand, at least in part, what happened that night.
#1 Most All Non-GRS (Global Response Staff), including CIA Personnel, had no real concept of the threat level they faced in Benghazi nor had any real concern about it. In fact, most of the CIA assets, despite their training, were too focused on their job (recruiting assets) rather than on the security of the facility and themselves. This is something that is endemic to civilians in general when you really think about it. How many times have you been so “zeroed in” on your errands or your job or whatever that you took no notice whatsoever of your situational awareness? Having portable technology like phones and tablets further compounds the problem also. How many times have you seen somebody with their head in their phone, oblivious to the world around them in the store, post office or worse yet, driving down the road? Hell we all have been guilty of it at one time or another, but we have to remember that our SITUATIONAL AWARENESS is one of First and Primary weapons against violent crime (and accidents) and we constantly have to be sharpening it and more to the point, PRACTICING IT, for it to be effective!
#2 The Facilities were equipped more for comfort and leisure than Security and Defense. This includes not only the physical construction, but the overall layout and geographic location as well. This goes back to the old adage “Build a Fortress First, then a Home” concept. You can see that most of the security features in both facilities were “add-ons” that were done with no forethought of escape. Take the Diplomatic Compound “Safe Room” for Ambassador Stevens. Simply adding an iron gate with a lock in a bedroom does not make it secure or safe. It needs to have a secret secondary escape (like a tunnel system that leads to a secure vehicle location) plus secondary ventilation systems in the event of fire or chemical attack. Believe me when I say that almost all Embassies across the world are equipped with these features. The geographic location needs to be relatively close to either an airport or heli-pad as well so you don’t have to FIGHT you way out in the event of evacuation. Something to consider when you think about home security and defending your home (against looters for example) when and if that day ever comes.
#3 The FORCED dependence on local “militias” such as the “17th February Militia” to act as both a QRF (Quick Reaction Force) and as Gate Security was a HUGE Disadvantage to the GRS Operators. Plus a lot of the Libyan Nationals working INSIDE the compound and Annex had not been properly vetted and we now know that they were feeding intel (and GPS Coordinates for Mortars) to the Terrorist group in REAL TIME via cell phones. Bottom line, the loyalty of these militias was highly questionable to begin with, and it was a serious mistake (mostly by the CIA) to place any faith into them as allies. This is something the U.S. has struggled with in both Iraq and Afghanistan as well when our Forces are trying to build trust and cohesion with indigenous military and police forces and the enemy, despite our best efforts to stop it, uses this trust against us. The best rule of thumb involving working with “questionable” characters is a saying from Tanto: “They are all BAD GUYS until they are NOT.”
In closing, I want to go back to the quote I started with by Tanto which I think sums up the issue.
“Does it seem like everybody else knows whats going on around here but us?”
These operators were constantly surrounded by enemies even when they thought they were surrounded by “friends.” This is the essence of Guerilla and Insurgency Warfare guys. There are no uniforms that distinguish the “good” guys from the “bad” guys. These terrorist slipped in and out of “friend and foe” roles that night like you and me change shirts. This put tremendous stress and confusion on an already growing “Fog of War.”
In Memory of Tyrone “Rone” Woods, Glen “Bub” Doherty, Sean Smith and Chris Stevens..May Your Memory Never Be Forgotten, May Your Deaths Be Avenged with Justice Soon.
That is all I have for now.
Stay Alert, Stay Armed and Stay Dangerous.
Reblogged this on The Missal.