![\"Winter-War-ii\"](\"https:\/\/hcsblogdotorg.files.wordpress.com\/2016\/07\/winter-war-ii.jpg?w=620\")
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In a recent article (Lessons from the Winter War: Frozen Grit and Finland\u2019s Fabian Defense<\/em><\/a>) Iskander Rehman gives a stirring tale of the Winter War pitting the Soviets against the Finns, but there is one big problem with it: It isn\u2019t, as he argues, an example of a Fabian strategy. \u00a0Rehman provides a link to an article<\/a> by Jim Holmes that clearly explains the idea.\u00a0 In sum, a Fabian strategy is designed to avoid risk and direct fighting, in order to draw out the conflict as much as possible in order to wear down and defeat the opponent through a combination of time, attrition, and a lack of decisive results. \u00a0Ultimately, the Fabian strategy paid off for Rome.\u00a0 The problem is the Winter War does not fit that description, Finnish strategy does not match it and a Fabian strategy would not have suited Finland\u2019s desire to retain its territorial integrity<\/a>.<\/p>\n The Finns simply did not use a Fabian strategy.\u00a0 They fought the Soviets to a standstill, head on<\/a>. \u00a0They didn\u2019t minimize risk or avoid fighting. \u00a0In many ways they did the opposite. \u00a0That is one of the most remarkable things about the conflict.\u00a0 A small, poorly equipped armed force, lacking much in the way of modern equipment, took on an enormous enemy force and stopped it dead in its tracks for the best parts of three months.\u00a0 Where they could, they counterattacked, including in the Karelian Isthmus on 23 December,<\/a> in a full on frontal assault.\u00a0 That\u2019s hardly Fabian.<\/p>\n Where the author also gets it wrong is to assume the fighting in east Finland, which he focuses on, particularly east of Lake Ladoga near Kollaa<\/a> and at Suomussalmi<\/a> and on the Raatentie<\/a>, was also part of a larger and deliberate Fabian strategy and was typical of the broader war.\u00a0 It was not. \u00a0Marshal Gustaf Mannerheim was very clear in his instructions to his subordinates, and was informed in this by his experience in World War I. He ordered that they were to hold ground, as Screen\u2019s excellent biography of Mannerheim<\/a> makes clear.\u00a0 Indeed, they were to vigorously counter-attack as the commander, Major-General Juho Heiskanen, of IV Corps (north-east of Lake Ladoga) found to his peril when he was sacked for not doing this vigorously enough.\u00a0 Indeed, the battles of eastern Finland were largely fought as a result of forced Finnish withdrawals in the face of Soviet attacks, rather than a planned retreat to avoid risk and direct fighting.\u00a0 Furthermore, the Finnish units in the east, much like those fighting in the Karelian isthmus were there to prevent a Soviet breakthrough, not simply to harass and draw out the conflict.\u00a0 That they used the much vaunted \u201cmotti\u201d tactics was as much a product of circumstance as it was prior planning.\u00a0 The Finns had initially attempted to annihilate the Soviets in the mottis, until it was obvious they did not possess sufficient firepower to do so. \u00a0That being said, it could be argued that this part of the war was Fabian, despite its annihilatory nature and the defense of fixed positions.\u00a0 Such an argument would have much to recommend it, but even if it is accepted it still only explains part of what went on in a subordinate theater and does not deal with the fighting on the Karelian isthmuswhich is where the war was won and lost.<\/a><\/p>\n So yes, this conflict does have some excellent lessons for thinking about future war, but let us not call it something it was not. Perhaps we could learn from the Finns often-excellent unit cohesion and their ability quickly to adapt on the fly and how that enabled them to resist for far longer than even they had thought possible. That really would be worth thinking about.<\/p>\n