{"id":15045,"date":"2016-05-06T09:30:52","date_gmt":"2016-05-06T14:30:52","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/hcstx.org\/?p=15045"},"modified":"2016-05-06T09:30:52","modified_gmt":"2016-05-06T14:30:52","slug":"espionage-files-did-the-pakistani-isi-poison-the-cia-station-chief-in-2011","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/2016\/05\/06\/espionage-files-did-the-pakistani-isi-poison-the-cia-station-chief-in-2011\/","title":{"rendered":"Espionage Files: Did The Pakistani ISI Poison the CIA Station Chief in 2011?"},"content":{"rendered":"

 <\/p>\n

\"CIA\"<\/p>\n

A leading article in The Washington Post<\/em> suggests that the United States Central Intelligence Agency suspected that its most senior officer in Pakistan was poisoned by the host country\u2019s intelligence services, in an attempt to kill him. The CIA pulled its station chief from Islamabad in the summer of 2011, two months after Operation NEPTUNE SPEAR, which saw the killing of al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad. The CIA official, who has since been identified as Mark Kelton, acted as the senior US intelligence representative in the Asian country. He had assumed the post, which was supposed to last at least two years, only seven months earlier. His abrupt removal raised questions, which were informally answered by Langley. There were rumors that Kelton\u2019s return to the US was health-related, but that the decision to replace him was also affected by his extremely poor relations with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate, Pakistan\u2019s powerful spy service.<\/p>\n

But on Thursday, The Washington Post<\/em>\u2019s Greg Miller said in a leading article<\/a> that Kelton\u2019s illness, which led to his replacement, had been so violent that it led him and others in the CIA to suspect that he had been poisoned. Prior to replacing him, the Agency had repeatedly flown the official back to the US for medical treatment, which proved fruitless. Eventually, some at Langley began to examine the possibility that the Pakistanis had poisoned Kelton, at a time when relations between the CIA and the ISI had sunk to unprecedented lows. Miller cites unnamed US intelligence officials who confirmed that the CIA had strong suspicions that Kelton had been deliberately poisoned. Even if the suspicions were groundless, said Miller, \u201cthe idea that the CIA and its station chief considered the ISI capable of such an act suggests that the breakdown in trust [between the two agencies] was even worse than widely assumed\u201d.<\/p>\n

Kelton has since recovered and assumed the post of deputy director for counterintelligence at the CIA before retiring from the Agency. The 59-year-old has since revealed his CIA background and even spoke with Miller on the phone as the Post<\/em> correspondent was preparing his story. Although he declined Miller\u2019s request for a detailed interview, the former CIA Islamabad station chief said that the initial suspicions about his poisoning \u201cdid not originate with\u201d him. He added, however, that he would \u201crather let that whole episode lie\u201d. The CIA told Miller that it had not uncovered any concrete evidence that the elements in the Pakistani government had poisoned Kelton. The embassy of Pakistan in Washington told The Washington Post<\/em> that Miller\u2019s story was \u201cfictional and not worthy of comment\u201d.<\/p>\n

Read the Original Article at Intel News<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

  A leading article in The Washington Post suggests that the United States Central Intelligence Agency suspected that its most senior officer in Pakistan was poisoned by the host country\u2019s intelligence services, in an attempt to kill him. The CIA pulled its station chief from Islamabad in the summer of 2011, two months after Operation…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_is_tweetstorm":false,"jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","enabled":false}}},"categories":[3617,2908,1725,6051,4880],"tags":[11523,10735,11524,11525],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15045"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=15045"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15045\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=15045"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=15045"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=15045"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}