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[Taken from the blog Bionic Mosquito<\/a>.<\/strong>]<\/p>\n <\/p>\n The Battle for Syria<\/strong><\/p>\n Part I<\/strong><\/p>\n There ran down the edges of the desert a string of cities and their connecting road \u2013 Aleppo, Homs, Damascus\u2026.<\/p>\n As long as these cities remain in enemy hands, the seacoast (Lebanon and Israel) will not be secure.\u00a0 But this isn\u2019t a story taken from today\u2019s age; so writes Hilaire Belloc in his book The Crusades: The World\u2019s Debate<\/em><\/a>, regarding the Holy Lands of Palestine. \u00a0It is curious to contemplate this perspective when considering more recent events.<\/p>\n The Crusades: Strategy<\/strong><\/p>\n The Crusaders were concerned solely about the cities along the sea \u2013 Antioch, Tripoli, and Beirut, as examples \u2013 and, of course, the gem of Jerusalem.\u00a0 They were so intent on these that they neglected and otherwise did not properly secure the cities inland \u2013 Aleppo, Homs, Damascus.\u00a0 Had they done so, they would have divided the Moslem world; had they done so, Belloc believes they would have held the Christian Holy Lands \u2013 well, setting aside the fact that the invading lords intermarried (Christian Armenians were a popular choice) and otherwise accepted many of the local customs.<\/p>\n Passing Aleppo unvisited to their left and east, leaving Aleppo undisturbed in Mohammedan hands, the captains of the great column now making south and west for the Orontes began the final failure of the Crusades.\u00a0 The neglect of Aleppo in 1097 was the root of all their future weakness, their increasing difficulties in holding Syria for the next two lifetimes, and their breakdown at Hattin after ninety years of desperately maintaining a doomed and falling cause.<\/p>\n This \u201cfinal failure\u201d was not at the end of European rule over regions of the Holy Land; it was virtually at the time the First Crusade arrived in the region \u2013 according to Belloc, the seeds of failure were sown at the beginning.\u00a0 Neglecting Damascus one year later was a second failure.\u00a0 Finally, when attempting to take Damascus fifty years later, the effort was poorly staffed and too late.<\/p>\n Belloc offers this string of Arab cities as a dividing line \u2013 to the west, mountain ranges, rivers, and valleys connecting to the Mediterranean coast (today\u2019s Lebanon and Israel); to the east, vast desert.\u00a0 It is the primary route connecting the Moslem worlds of Mesopotamia to the east and Egypt to the west (broadly speaking).<\/p>\n The ultimate failure of the Crusades lay in this: that Christendom got hold of the first or seacoast road, kept only a doubtful or disputed grasp on parts of the second or river road, and altogether failed to build the third road along the edge of the desert<\/em>. (Emphasis in original)<\/p>\n The first and third roads have been identified \u2013 the sea coast and the string of inland cities, respectively.\u00a0 What is this second, river road?<\/p>\n The second road would naturally follow the central valley, getting plentiful water from the Orontes and the Jordan.<\/p>\n The Orontes flows north from Syria, then west to the Mediterranean just south of the Amanos Mountains; it passes Antakya, and flows to the sea north of Latakia.\u00a0 Control Aleppo and you control access to this road.<\/p>\n As to the central valley?<\/p>\n The Beqaa Valley<\/a>\u2026is a fertile valley in eastern Lebanon.<\/p>\n The Beqaa Valley lies on the route directly between Beirut and Damascus.\u00a0 It has also been the location of numerous conflicts between Israel and Syria virtually since the founding of Israel as a state.\u00a0 Belloc offers, perhaps, a clue as to this region:<\/p>\n Damascus never fell and because Damascus remained in the hands of Islam, Jerusalem sooner or later was bound to follow.<\/p>\n \u2026it is Damascus throughout the ages that has determined the fate of Syria.\u00a0 It was Damascus on which the Assyrian power had concentrated centuries earlier and had found so difficult to grasp; it was from Damascus that Pompey gave orders which made the Roman soldiers the possessors of the whole land; it was the fall of Damascus to the first Mohammedan invasion which determined the success of that invasion and made it permanent \u2013 and now it was Damascus that would have confirmed the Crusading effort.<\/p>\n Control Damascus and you control Syria.\u00a0 Control Syria and you control Jerusalem.\u00a0 This is what the Crusaders missed.\u00a0 According to Belloc, this sealed their fate \u2013 from the beginning.<\/p>\n The Crusades: Tactics<\/strong><\/p>\n There were four main armies participating in the first Crusade:<\/p>\n The first in time as well as in distinction was the army mainly composed of French-speaking Walloons, which followed Godfrey of Bouillon, the Duke of Lower Lorraine, who had with him his dark-haired, dead-pale, grave brother Baldwin of Boulogne.<\/p>\n The second army, following, in a similarly loose fashion Raymond IV, Count of Toulouse and Marquis of Provence\u2026.<\/p>\n A third army might roughly be called \u201cThe Northern French.\u201d\u00a0 It had no single leader though it formed one loose body.\u00a0 The man of greatest power in it was the sovereign of Normandy, Duke Robert, the son of William, the Conqueror\u2026.<\/p>\n The fourth army demands particular attention for it was of a very special kind.\u00a0 It is generally called \u201cNorman\u201d because it was organized under those powerful men of Norman descent who had got hold of southern Italy and Sicily during the last two generations before the Holy War.<\/p>\n Prince Bohemond, brother of the reigning King of Sicily, led this fourth army; in Bohemond, we find a hint at the reality of the Crusading armies \u2013 this reality thereby shaping the tactics.\u00a0 His plan was to cut a deal with Byzantium and the Greek Emperor \u2013 ignoring the Pope who called for the Crusade\u2026<\/p>\n \u2026and so would get for himself a principality really independent under the nominal legal headship of Constantinople; not the Holy Sepulchre, not Jerusalem\u2026some realm of his own to be occupied and settled on the way to the Holy Land.<\/p>\n Every army was independent from the other; these armies were drawn from men in a society without a \u201csovereign\u201d in the sense that we understand the term today.\u00a0 Belloc, speaking for a fictional man from those times, a Crusader, while observing modern government, offers:<\/p>\n \u201cWhat is all this about nations?\u201d\u00a0 \u201cWhere does authority lie and how is it divided?\u201d<\/p>\n Not only were the armies independent \u2013 even those composing each army carried his decentralized position with him:<\/p>\n A man who moved from one body to another, taking with him his immediate dependents (for even the poorest knight had some attendant, and most of them had several) was not a deserter in our sense; he was not even a deserter if he chose to ride away and have done with the whole business; the penalties which could attach to him for so acting were as a rule moral penalties only \u2013 if any.<\/p>\n Each army could act independently.\u00a0 Each knight within each army could do so as well.\u00a0Add to this the attitude of Bohemond, which was unique when compared to his peers only in pledging his allegiance to the Greeks \u2013 but not unique in looking for his own principality without a larger purpose \u2013 and it is easy to understand why coordinating the combined might of the Crusading force was not accomplished.<\/p>\n Fast-Forward<\/strong><\/p>\n Before traversing 1000 years to current events, another stop or two might be considered.\u00a0From Palestinians: The Making of a People<\/a><\/em>, by Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, describing the situation in the mid-nineteenth century:<\/p>\n Jerusalem\u2019s merchants sent most of their trade (especially their locally produced soap and olive oil) through Damascus.<\/p>\n As trade will normally follow the most efficient route, it would seem the connection of Damascus with Jerusalem was natural \u2013 at least absent religious animosities (kept in reasonable check under much of the Ottoman period).<\/p>\n \u201cGreater Syria\u201d was viewed as (or hoped to be considered as) one by at least some Arabs at the time of the end of World War One:<\/p>\n Faysal meant today\u2019s Syria and Lebanon, as well as Transjordan and Palestine.<\/p>\n Of course, in the end the region was divided:<\/p>\n Syria would be put under French protection, and Palestine would remain with the British.\u00a0 \u201cThe Arabs will not consent to that,\u201d Husseini responded.<\/p>\n The time is the Great War, the issues are how the West might carve and divide the Middle East and how the locals might feel about this.\u00a0 As during the time of the Crusades, the issue remains the line running from Aleppo to Damascus, running through Homs and Hama.\u00a0 More on this from David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace<\/em><\/a>:<\/p>\n Clayton\u2026reported that al-Faruqi said Hussein would never allow France to have Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and Damascus.<\/p>\n Clayton and al-Faruqi recognized that France could not be excluded from the Christian coast of Syria-Lebanon (Hussein later insisted otherwise, specifically to include Beirut).\u00a0But the Arabs indicated they would oppose \u201cby force of arms\u201d any French attempts to occupy the districts encompassed by this string of inland cities.<\/p>\n The towns had another important feature in common: they constituted the railroad line.<\/p>\n The French built the line some decades earlier.\u00a0 Of course, a railroad line was of no consideration to the Crusaders; however the location of the railroad line supports the value of the corridor for transport and travel \u2013 bound by the mountains and difficult sea-coast to the west and the desert to the east.<\/p>\n In the end, the French retained authority over Greater Syria, to include what is today Syria and Lebanon \u2013 the inland cities as well as the coast beholden to these cities over the centuries.<\/p>\n Versailles carved Greater Syria into pieces: Transjordan was to become a (seemingly independent) Arab state; Palestine would go to the British, and Syria (to include Lebanon) would belong to the French.\u00a0 From One Palestine, Complete<\/a><\/em>, by Tom Segev:<\/p>\n But no one in Palestine was happy; the Arabs felt the country had been torn away from Syria; the Zionists were bitter because Transjordan had been torn away from Palestine, and the northern border differed significantly from the Zionists\u2019 map.<\/p>\n It should be recognized that Syrian-Arab society included many of what Fromkin refers to as \u201csecret-societies.\u201d\u00a0 Each society had its own objectives and desired outcome.\u00a0 Some wanted to remain under Ottoman rule \u2013 if they could not have independence, they preferred to be ruled by Moslems.\u00a0 Also, they enjoyed the wealth generated by trade opportunities afforded by the Ottomans.<\/p>\n Other societies had their own purposes.\u00a0 There was little that fully unified the disparate tribes and clans.<\/p>\n Today<\/strong><\/p>\n Of course, to speak of an \u201cArab\u201d position during the time spanning from the Crusades to Versailles is an exaggeration, a stretch.\u00a0 This has changed in recent years, at least in Iraq, Libya, and Syria \u2013 albeit under the control of less-than-savory players.\u00a0 Of course, it has reverted in two of the three \u2013 and the third (Syria) is under assault even now \u2013 hence, the focus of this post.<\/p>\n Assad must go, so we are told.\u00a0 He (along with Hussein in Iraq and Ghaddafi in Libya) brought some semblance of unity within their respective states.\u00a0 Yet, historically it was this disunity that proved to be a weakness for any unified Arab cause and a strength for any enemies.<\/p>\n Is this why Assad must go?\u00a0 He represents a risk of presiding over a reasonably unified Arab state (as did Hussein and Ghaddafi elsewhere in the region)?<\/p>\n Assad must go, so we are told.\u00a0 While rebels control much of eastern Syria \u2013 the desert \u2013 this critical western region of Syria (Aleppo, Homs, Damascus, the regions along the Beqaa) is still controlled, mostly, by Assad.<\/p>\n Is this why Assad must go?\u00a0 Whoever controls Damascus will eventually control Jerusalem?<\/p>\n If successful, it will be rebels in control of Damascus and this critical region.\u00a0 Perhaps it is enough to turn the entire region into a war zone, with Arab factions fighting amongst each other and not looking outside \u2013 such that Damascus cannot threaten Jerusalem for several generations.<\/p>\n Could this be what is behind \u201cAssad must go\u201d?<\/p>\n Perhaps.\u00a0 At least according to Belloc.<\/p>\n Read the Original Article at Bionic Mosquito<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n <\/p>\n The Battle for Syria<\/strong><\/p>\n Part II<\/strong><\/p>\n I continue with Hilaire Belloc and his book\u00a0The Crusades: The World\u2019s Debate<\/em><\/a>.\u00a0 Recall from my previous post<\/a> on this topic: Belloc offers that the Crusades might have been successful had the Crusaders taken the inland cities stretching from Aleppo to Damascus.\u00a0 Had they done so, they would have separated the Moslem east from the Moslem west and at the same time protected the access to Jerusalem as well as their holdings along the coast of what is today Israel and Lebanon.<\/p>\n Recall also the similarity to today\u2019s chaos in the Middle East \u2013 chaos perpetrated by the west.\u00a0 This chaos has destroyed the pockets of unity developing within these Moslem \/ Arab countries \u2013 Iraq, Libya and now Syria.\u00a0 Might this fomented chaos serve a similar purpose?<\/p>\n On to Belloc:<\/p>\n \u2026all that was needed to crystallise the military situation and determine Moslem victory was unity of command on the Moslem side.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n \u201cUnity of command on the Moslem side\u201d did not occur during the first several decades of occupation by Crusaders.\u00a0 However, this was slowly changing, first with Zengi<\/a>:<\/p>\n Imad ad-Din Zengi (c. 1085 \u2013 14 September 1146), also romanized as Zangi, Zengui, Zenki, and Zanki, was a Turkish atabeg<\/a> who ruled Mosul, Aleppo, Hama, and Edessa. He was the namesake of the Zengid dynasty.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n As is noted, Zengi successfully consolidated a good portion of the eastern Moslem Middle East, with the important exception of Damascus, as noted by Belloc:<\/p>\n Zengi had been held up for years by quarrels of rivals in Mesopotamia.\u00a0 These he had at last overcome.\u00a0 He ruled at Mosul as at Aleppo \u2013 but he had not acquired Damascus.\u00a0 He could not act toward the south.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Zengi made many attempts on Damascus, but failed each time.\u00a0 The Damascenes often allied with the Crusader army of Jerusalem in order to repel Zengi\u2019s attacks.<\/p>\n Belloc contends that failing to secure the line from Aleppo to Damascus made the situation for the Crusaders perpetually vulnerable.\u00a0 From the moment that Zengi began consolidating Moslem forces, the vulnerability to Christendom in the Levant became a reality.<\/p>\n Then, as now, the source of disunion among Arab Moslems was not only geographic; it was also grounded in the antagonism between the major sects of Islam:<\/p>\n More delaying to Moslem unity even than this division among Syrian Moslems was the sharp antagonism between Egypt with its Fatimite, that is, heretical Caliphate at Cairo and the orthodox Caliphate of all that lay east of Jordan and Orontes, centered spiritually in Baghdad.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n The Fatimid Caliphate<\/a>:<\/p>\n The Fatimid Caliphate was an Ismaili Shia Islamic caliphate that spanned a large area of North Africa, from the Red Sea in the east to the Atlantic Ocean in the west. The dynasty ruled across the Mediterranean coast of Africa and ultimately made Egypt the centre of the caliphate.<\/p>\n The Fatimids claimed descent from Fatima bint Muhammad, the daughter of Islamic prophet Muhammad.<\/p>\n The ruling class belonged to the Ismaili branch of Shi\u2019ism, as did the leaders of the dynasty.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n The \u201corthodox Caliphate\u201d located in Baghdad refers to the Sunni Abbasid Caliphate<\/a>:<\/p>\n The Abbasid Caliphate was the third of the Islamic caliphates to succeed the Islamic prophet Muhammad. The Abbasid dynasty descended from Muhammad\u2019s youngest uncle, Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib (566\u2013653 CE), from whom the dynasty takes its name. They ruled as caliphs, for most of their period from their capital in Baghdad in modern-day Iraq, after assuming authority over the Muslim empire from the Umayyads in 750 CE (132 AH).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Returning to Belloc:<\/p>\n It was the question of Egypt \u2013 the all-importance to Jerusalem of keeping up the quarrel between Cairo and Damascus, the all-importance to Damascus of acquiring Cairo and welding all Levantine Islam into one body for the encirclement and destruction of the Crusaders\u2026<\/p><\/blockquote>\n The objective of the Crusaders was to ensure continuing conflict and enmity between and among the Moslem Arabs.\u00a0 The objective of Zengi was to begin the unity of the east \u2013 Egypt \u2013 and the west \u2013 Syria and Mesopotamia.\u00a0 It meant unity of Damascus with the rest of Syria.<\/p>\n After Zengi came Nureddin<\/a>:<\/p>\n Nur ad-Din was the second son of Imad ad-Din Zengi, the Turkic atabeg of Aleppo and Mosul, who was a devoted enemy of the crusader presence in Syria. After the assassination of his father in 1146, Nur ad-Din and his older brother Saif ad-Din Ghazi I divided the kingdom between themselves, with Nur ad-Din governing Aleppo and Saif ad-Din Ghazi establishing himself in Mosul.<\/p>\n Nur ad-Din sought to make alliances with his Muslim neighbours in northern Iraq and Syria in order to strengthen the Muslim front against their Western enemies. In 1147 he signed a bilateral treaty with Mu\u2019in ad-Din Unur, governor of Damascus\u2026<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Damascus now aligned with Baghdad.\u00a0 Yet, this peaceful alliance did not last long.<\/p>\n The growing weakness of Damascus under Mujir ad-Din allowed Nur ad-Din to overthrow him in 1154, with help from the population of the city. Damascus was annexed to Zengid territory, and all of Syria was unified under the authority of Nur ad-Din, from Edessa in the north to the Hauran in the south.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n In 1154, Nureddin took Damascus, unifying all of Syria.\u00a0 Nureddin next turned to Egypt (returning to Belloc):<\/p>\n It was vital to Jerusalem that Cairo should be if possible an ally; if not an ally, a sort of dependent; and at all costs that Cairo should not be absorbed by the power of Nureddin.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n A very applicable sentence if one wants to describe current western policy toward Moslems in the Middle East.<\/p>\n By 1164, the conquest of Egypt by Syria began.\u00a0 Ultimately, the Fatimite Caliphate in Egypt was suppressed.<\/p>\n The Crusaders understood the situation:<\/p>\n All now knew that Christendom in the Levant was on the defensive and all could feel that one issue dominated the future: whether, or rather when, the Mohammedan world of the Near East should achieve complete unity.\u00a0 By intrigue and policy that unity might be postponed.\u00a0 It might be delayed; it could not be avoided.<\/p>\n When it fully appeared, when there was one Mohammedan command all around, Jerusalem was doomed.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n