{"id":12656,"date":"2016-03-04T09:27:19","date_gmt":"2016-03-04T15:27:19","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/hcstx.org\/?p=12656"},"modified":"2016-03-04T09:27:19","modified_gmt":"2016-03-04T15:27:19","slug":"how-nato-can-disrupt-russias-new-way-of-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/2016\/03\/04\/how-nato-can-disrupt-russias-new-way-of-war\/","title":{"rendered":"How NATO Can Disrupt Russia’s New Way of War"},"content":{"rendered":"
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\"Russia1\"<\/p>\n

Here are a few things the West can do against Moscow\u2019s potent combo of special forces and electronic warfare.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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The Ukrainian soldiers peered over the cold dirt edge of their trench. The artillery had abated, but the whine of a nearby spotter UAV<\/span> promised its imminent return. In the distance, they could see camouflaged <\/em>spetsnaz moving into position with suppressed Vintorez marksman rifles. Looking at his radio, a lieutenant dared to hope. \u201cAleksei, you see this? Radio\u2019s working. Maybe a break in the jamming.\u201d \u201cIs that really a good thing?\u201d his sergeant responded. \u201cGo ahead and call, that\u2019s what they want. The Russians will hear you first and send their thermobaric regards. That is if the <\/em>spetsnaz don\u2019t get here first.\u201d The young officer slumped. His comms gear was useless; he and his men were cut off and\u00a0alone.<\/em><\/p>\n

Much has been written<\/a> about Russia\u2019s innovative concepts of operations in Ukraine and Syria, variously dubbed \u201chybrid<\/a>\u201d or \u201cnon-linear\u201d war, but specific tactics have received far less scrutiny than they deserve. A look, in particular, at Russia\u2019s use of electronic warfare (EW<\/span>) and special operations forces (SOF<\/span>) suggests ways that U.S.<\/span> and other NATO<\/span> forces might prepare to counter\u00a0them.<\/p>\n

Technology and new EW<\/span> doctrines have accelerated thedecades-old competition<\/a> between active attack systems and countermeasures, shortening the evolutionary cycle from weeks and months to mere hours. In The Nature and Content of New-Generation War<\/em><\/a>, sometimes described as a \u201chow-to manual\u201d<\/a> for the seizure of Crimea, two senior Russian military officers note the importance of EW<\/span> in the Gulf War and assert the need for sustained \u201celectronic knockdown\u201d attacks in future conflicts. They recommend that Russian ground forces \u201cbe continually improved and equipped with\u2026EW<\/span>\u00a0capabilities.\u201d<\/p>\n

The positioning of EW<\/span> forces in the Russian order-of-battle<\/a>underscores their importance. Every military district houses an independent EW<\/span> brigade, supplemented by strategic battalions with specialized EW<\/span> equipment and a special independent EW<\/span>brigade carrying the title \u201cSupreme Main Command\u201d (only two other units in the Russian Armed Forces reportedly carry this\u00a0title).<\/p>\n

In Ukraine, Russia frequently jams its enemies\u2019 tactical communications through a variety of means. During the initial Crimean seizure, cellphones in the area were reportedlyjammed<\/a> by Russian warships. As the conflict moved to the Donbas, pro-Ukrainian and OSCE<\/span> UAVs found their data links persistently jammed<\/a>. Further, Russian UAVs that can carry theLeyer-3 jammer<\/a>\u00a0and direct artillery fire<\/a> have been spotted inUkraine<\/a> and Syria<\/a>. Where Ukrainian forces have acquired encrypted radios, Russian EW<\/span> troops hone in on their stronger signal to geolocate their position<\/a>. These and many similar tactics enable Russia to erode its adversaries\u2019 intelligence-gathering, communications, and command and\u00a0control.<\/p>\n

Russian EW<\/span> gear may even threaten strategic collection platforms. For instance, the Murmansk-BN<\/span> long-range jammer was recently deployed<\/a> to Crimea, and the Krasukha-4 advancedEW<\/span> system has been observed in bothUkraine<\/a> and Syria<\/a>. Even though the technical capabilities of these two systems are likely exaggerated for propaganda purposes, they are believed to have the potential to interfere<\/a> with low-earth orbit spy satellites, airborne surveillance platforms, and other collection systems. In any case, their deployment certainly allows them to prove their capabilities against advanced U.S.<\/span> and NATO<\/span>\u00a0platforms.<\/p>\n

Russia also uses its EW<\/span> capabilities to amplify the effectiveness of its special operations forces, the \u201clittle green men\u201d used to such noteworthy effect<\/a> in Ukraine. In his famous article on hybrid warfare<\/a>, Gen. Valery Gerasimov asserts that SOF<\/span> and internal opposition are used \u201cto create a permanently operating front through the entire territory of the enemy state\u2026\u201d To the authors of The Nature and Content of New-Generation War<\/em>, SOF<\/span> are maneuverable shock infantry that gather targeting information for Russian strikes and \u201croll over\u201d weakened enemies. Retired Colonel-General Anatoly Zaitsev writes<\/a> how the ultimate goal of SOF<\/span> \u201cis to destroy the enemy\u2019s critical facilities and disrupt or destroy his forces\u2019 systems.\u201d Russia\u2019s renewed interest in SOF<\/span> is further illustrated by the creation<\/a> of the elite Komanda Spetsial\u2019nikh Operatsiy (KSO<\/span>) command and deployment of various SOF<\/span> forces in Ukraine and\u00a0Syria.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s hard to comprehensively track Russian SOF<\/span>, but they have been observed operating throughout Ukraine. At the beginning of the conflict, KSO<\/span><\/a> and naval spetsnaz units seized several strategic sites, including airports, surface-to-air missile batteries, Ukrainian military facilities, and the Crimean parliament building. As the conflict shifted to the Donbas, otherSOF<\/span> elements were deployed<\/a> to protect Russian technical trainers, instill control over the separatists\u2019 chain of command, and train and support<\/a> separatist\u00a0fighters.<\/p>\n

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In Syria, the Russian SOF<\/span> deployment is more ambiguous and less overt. KSO\u00a0<\/span>elements have recently been\u201credeployed\u201d<\/a> from Ukraine to help coordinate Russian airstrikes. In addition, \u201chighly-secretive\u201d Zaslon SOF<\/span>personnel have been deployed<\/a> to guard sensitive Russian equipment, personnel, and information. Additional SOF<\/span> activity is likely as Russia\u2019s involvement in Syria\u00a0expands.<\/p>\n

Moscow has proven adept at using EW<\/span> and SOF<\/span> in concert to fragment and slow adversaries\u2019 strategic decision-making. While \u201clittle green men\u201d secure key locations and train local forces, electronic-warfare forces distort ISR<\/span> collection by adversaries and third parties, limiting their ability to project an accurate counter-narrative to inform confused domestic audiences and a divided international community. And even when a defender does manage to grasp the situation, RussianEW<\/span> attacks on their command, control, communications, and intelligence disrupts their\u00a0response.<\/p>\n

Nations threatened by Russia\u2019s hybrid warfare can strengthen their resilience through investing in two areas. First, build stronger and more redundant C3I<\/span> by encrypting radio, data links, and satellite communications, and developing promising new technologies such as cognitive EW<\/span><\/a>. Although Russia\u2019s advanced EW<\/span> capabilities can attack nearly any system, redundancy can limit their impact. Second, improve the ability to monitor and understand the battlespace by improving tacticalISR<\/span>. UAVs are key: hand-launched ones, medium-altitude drones with greater endurance, and airborne ISR<\/span> platforms with electro-optical\/infrared sensors and signals intelligence payloads\u2014all of which must be supported by secure data\u00a0links.<\/p>\n

Yet since no single platform or system provides a silver-bullet solution to hybrid warfare, the U.S.<\/span> and its NATO<\/span> partners must explore developing new operating concepts; for example, ground forces should be prepared to mimic the U.S.<\/span> Navy\u2019s \u201cemissions control<\/a>\u201d by operating in the absence of a data network. They must increase joint training<\/a> against conventional and unconventional Russian military scenarios, allowing NATO<\/span> to strengthen its response, practice its interoperability, and and signal its defensive resolve. Ultimately, they must learn how<\/em> to assess their own prowess, doctrine, strategy and tactics against an adversary whose expertise in hybrid warfare is growing by the\u00a0day.<\/p>\n

Read the Original Article at Defense One<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/article>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Here are a few things the West can do against Moscow\u2019s potent combo of special forces and electronic warfare. The Ukrainian soldiers peered over the cold dirt edge of their trench. The artillery had abated, but the whine of a nearby spotter UAV promised its imminent return. In the distance, they could see camouflaged spetsnaz…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_is_tweetstorm":false,"jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","enabled":false}}},"categories":[74,3812,4479,4333,2378,1814,1286,2820,1894,4418,17,65,1898],"tags":[5001,1240,2779,5125,1453,2401,5126,4416,5127],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12656"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12656"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12656\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12656"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12656"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12656"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}