{"id":11707,"date":"2016-02-08T16:50:43","date_gmt":"2016-02-08T22:50:43","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/hcstx.org\/?p=11707"},"modified":"2016-02-08T16:50:43","modified_gmt":"2016-02-08T22:50:43","slug":"paradoxes-of-the-gray-zone","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/2016\/02\/08\/paradoxes-of-the-gray-zone\/","title":{"rendered":"Paradoxes of the &#8220;Gray Zone&#8221;"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><img decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-11708\" src=\"https:\/\/hcsblogdotorg.files.wordpress.com\/2016\/02\/little_green_men_0-400x600.jpg\" alt=\"little_green_men_0-400x600\" width=\"400\" height=\"600\" \/><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Gray, it seems, is the new black. The concept of \u201cgray zone\u201d conflict has generated significant attention and controversy recently, within both the U.S. government and the broader strategic studies community. Some analysts have identified gray zone conflict as a new phenomenon that will increasingly characterize, and challenge, the international system in the years to come. Others have argued that the concept is overhyped, ahistorical, and perhaps even meaningless. \u201cThe \u2018gray wars\u2019 concept lacks even the most basic strategic sense,\u201d writes Adam Elkus. \u201cBeneath the hype is something rather <em>ooh-la-lame <\/em>rather than <em>ooh-la-la.<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n<p>So what is gray zone conflict, to begin with? Gray zone conflict is best understood as activity that is coercive and aggressive in nature, but that is deliberately designed to remain below the threshold of conventional military conflict and open interstate war. Gray zone approaches are mostly the province of revisionist powers\u2014those actors that seek to modify some aspect of the existing international environment\u2014and the goal is to reap gains, whether territorial or otherwise, that are normally associated with victory in war. Yet gray zone approaches are meant to achieve those gains <em>without <\/em>escalating to overt warfare, <em>without <\/em>crossing established red-lines, and thus <em>without <\/em>exposing the practitioner to the penalties and risks that such escalation might bring.<\/p>\n<p>Gray zone challenges are thus inherently ambiguous in nature. They feature unconventional tactics, from cyberattacks, to propaganda and political warfare, to economic coercion and sabotage, to sponsorship of armed proxy fighters, to creeping military expansionism. Those tactics, in turn, are frequently shrouded in misinformation and deception, and are often conducted in ways that are meant to make proper attribution of the responsible party difficult to nail down. Gray zone challenges, in other words, are ambiguous and usually incremental aggression. They represent that coercion that is, to varying degrees, disguised; they eat away at the status quo one nibble at a time.<\/p>\n<p>Viewed in these terms, it becomes clear that gray zone conflict is real enough, and that gray zone approaches are indeed prevalent in today\u2019s security environment. Since 2014, Russia has destabilized and dismembered Ukraine through the use of armed proxies, \u201cvolunteer\u201d forces, and unacknowledged aggression. In Asia, China is using gray zone tactics as part of a campaign of creeping expansionism in the South China Sea. In the Middle East, Iran is using, as it has for many years, subversion and proxy warfare in an effort to destabilize adversaries and shift the balance of power in the region. These are leading examples of the gray zone phenomenon today.<\/p>\n<p>Contrary to what skeptics argue, then, the gray zone is not an illusion. But if the concept does pack a punch, it is also elusive and even paradoxical. Edward Luttwak has written about the paradoxical logic of strategy\u2014the fact that it seems to embody multiple, and seemingly contradictory, truths at once.<span style=\"font-size:11.1111px;line-height:16.6667px;\">\u00a0<\/span>In dealing with the gray zone, this basic proposition applies in spades. The gray zone concept may seem relatively straightforward at first glance. But upon closer inspection, it is fraught with complexities, contradictions, and ironies. These characteristics do not make the concept worthless or meaningless. They do, however, make it quite slippery.<\/p>\n<p>Accordingly, this essay surfaces eight paradoxes, complexities, and nuances at the heart of the gray zone idea\u2014and at the heart of efforts to respond to gray zone challenges. The goal is not to provide a comprehensive discussion of the gray zone concept and its defining characteristics, for that task has been undertaken in greater depth elsewhere.<span style=\"font-size:11.1111px;line-height:16.6667px;\">\u00a0<\/span>The goal, rather, is to throw some of the gray zone\u2019s central paradoxes into sharper relief, and thereby to shed greater light on a concept that is at once deeply controversial and deeply important to debates about the future of warfare and U.S. policy.<\/p>\n<p>Read the Remainder at <strong><a href=\"http:\/\/www.fpri.org\/articles\/2016\/02\/paradoxes-gray-zone\">Foreign Policy Research Institute<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>&nbsp; Gray, it seems, is the new black. The concept of \u201cgray zone\u201d conflict has generated significant attention and controversy recently, within both the U.S. government and the broader strategic studies community. Some analysts have identified gray zone conflict as a new phenomenon that will increasingly characterize, and challenge, the international system in the years&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_is_tweetstorm":false,"jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","enabled":false}}},"categories":[2280,1583,1704,3140,74,4479,4333,2004,2378,2967,2098,2426,1894,4418,3321,1898],"tags":[748,4490,4491,4492,4493,1567],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11707"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11707"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11707\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11707"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11707"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11707"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}