{"id":10173,"date":"2015-12-26T12:00:45","date_gmt":"2015-12-26T18:00:45","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/hcstx.org\/?p=10173"},"modified":"2015-12-26T12:00:45","modified_gmt":"2015-12-26T18:00:45","slug":"military-history-the-forgotten-task-force-of-the-forgotten-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/2015\/12\/26\/military-history-the-forgotten-task-force-of-the-forgotten-war\/","title":{"rendered":"Military History: The Forgotten Task Force of the Forgotten War"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><img decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-10174\" src=\"https:\/\/hcsblogdotorg.files.wordpress.com\/2015\/12\/chosinfeatured-610x400.jpg\" alt=\"ChosinFeatured-610x400\" width=\"610\" height=\"400\" \/><br \/>\nThe Korean War has often been referred to as the forgotten war.\u00a0 Sandwiched between WWII and Vietnam the Korean War is often lost in our histories and remembrances.\u00a0 There is very little in this war that is \u201csexy\u201d for historians.\u00a0 In the end the final lines end pretty much where they started and nothing was really resolved.\u00a0 There was no defeat, no victory, and because of that people just don\u2019t study the Korean War.<\/p>\n<p>There are a few notable exceptions to this.\u00a0 Among these is what has been called the Chosin campaign.\u00a0 It\u2019s a story the United States Marine Corps is rightly proud of.\u00a0 After being encircled, and attacked relentlessly, the 1<sup>st<\/sup> Marine Division managed a fighting retreat 80 miles to the port of Hungnam, where they were they were successfully evacuated. Lost in the pride that the Marines rightly take in their efforts, is what happened to a small Army task force sent into the area to guard the Marines\u2019 eastern flank.\u00a0 Its battles and subsequent destruction have largely been forgotten by history.\u00a0<img decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"alignright size-medium wp-image-13603\" src=\"http:\/\/www.rhinoden.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/12\/Chosin1-300x233.jpg\" alt=\"Chosin1\" width=\"300\" height=\"233\" \/><\/p>\n<p>Task force Faith as it became to be known was a composite group from RCT 31, made up of 1\/32 Infantry, 3\/31 Infantry, two batteries of 57th FA and a single company from the 15<sup>th<\/sup> AAA.\u00a0 It was hastily assembled from the understrength 7<sup>th<\/sup>Infantry Division by the X Corps commander, who was worried about the Marine\u2019s eastern flank.\u00a0 Colonel MacLean, the 31<sup>st<\/sup> RCT commander, would command the task force, and support the Marines as they moved north and west to support the expected 8<sup>th<\/sup> army drive to the Yalu river, ending the war.\u00a0 That is not what happened.<\/p>\n<p>What happened was that on the night of 27<sup>th<\/sup> of November 1950, in -30 degree weather, the 80<sup>th<\/sup> division of the Chinese army attacked the eastern positions, and all along the reservoir nearly every position held was attacked and isolated.<\/p>\n<p>1\/32 managed to hold their own the first night, at the forward position. However, 3\/31 and A and B batteries 57<sup>th<\/sup> FA at what became known as the inlet perimeter, were very nearly overrun.\u00a0 In the first night the 3\/31 CP, and 57<sup>th<\/sup> FA CP were both destroyed, injuring or killing a majority of the command staff for the inlet perimeter.\u00a0 The only saving grace were the AAA weapons, the quad .50 halftrack M-16 and dual 40 MM M-19.\u00a0 When the morning broke, as many as 200 enemy in front of one of the M-19\u2019s.\u00a0\u00a0 As if to add to the calamity, just north of the 31<sup>st<\/sup> RCT rear CP, the medical company attached to the 31<sup>st<\/sup> RCT was ambushed and completely destroyed.<\/p>\n<p>The fighting continued throughout the day.\u00a0 1\/32 had the benefit of Captain Stamford, USMC and his tactical air control party, which eased the pressure on the beleaguered battalion.\u00a0 The inlet perimeter, unfortunately, lost their TACP the first night when the 3\/31 CP was overrun.<\/p>\n<p>After the second night, LTC Don C Faith Jr, the battalion commander of 1\/32, began a fighting withdrawal from the forward positions, to the inlet perimeter.\u00a0 During the move Col MacLean, mistook Chinese troops for Americans, and attempted desperately to get two formations to stop shooting at each other.\u00a0 He was wounded, and captured, and though his exact fate isn\u2019t known its highly likely he died in captivity.<\/p>\n<p>This is when things became desperate for the task force.\u00a0 The aid stations quickly ran out of morphine and bandages.\u00a0 Ammunition supplies became critically low, most notably for the M-19.\u00a0 In the confusion of the battle, the 40 MM that they so desperately needed was dropped to the 31<sup>st<\/sup> rear CP, not the inlet perimeter.\u00a0<img decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"alignright size-medium wp-image-13604\" src=\"http:\/\/www.rhinoden.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/12\/Chosin-300x241.jpg\" alt=\"Chosin\" width=\"300\" height=\"241\" \/><\/p>\n<p>On the night of 30 November, LTC Faith, who had become the de facto commander of the force, realized that he couldn\u2019t hold out another day.\u00a0 There was no reserve to speak of at all.\u00a0 Cooks, and headquarters personnel were holding the line.\u00a0 There would be no help coming from the Marines, who had problems of their own.\u00a0 Ammunition was in critically short supply, many troops with only one magazine left.\u00a0 He ordered a breakout attempt to begin at noon on the next day 1 December.<\/p>\n<p>Almost immediately the formation began to fall apart.\u00a0 Nobody had even told company M, heavy mortars, that the break out was happening, they just saw the trucks lining up and joined them.\u00a0 There was almost no communication between the various elements almost all the company and platoon radios had long ago stopped working.\u00a0\u00a0 Worse, the troops were difficult to handle owing to the extreme cold, and a vast majority of officers and NCOs being killed or wounded.<\/p>\n<p>Almost immediately when the break out started, things started going horribly wrong.\u00a0 Napalm was dropped on advancing elements of 1\/32 which lead the formation, stalling the progress, and demoralizing many of the troops.\u00a0 Road blocks halted the column, as well as blown bridges.\u00a0 Trucks died, wounded were being shoved in ever more crowded trucks.\u00a0 Then the Chinese began firing on the trucks killing and wounding many.<\/p>\n<p>By the time the convoy made it to hill 1221, where the medical company had been destroyed, darkness had fallen.\u00a0 3\/31 had essentially dissolved as a fighting formation leaving the truck column open to attack.\u00a0 Majors were now leading squads.\u00a0 Many riflemen didn\u2019t have any ammunition, or their weapons wouldn\u2019t fire in the -30 degree weather.\u00a0 With the darkness another problem arose, the air cover, which had been so essential, was gone.\u00a0 Hill 1221 was held by the Chinese and had to be taken if the convoy was to continue.\u00a0 It was attacked several times by groups with almost no coordination.<\/p>\n<p>Now, try to imagine it at this point, if you\u2019re one of the troops in this formation.\u00a0 You\u2019ve been fighting for 5 nights and 4 days almost non-stop.\u00a0 You have almost no ammunition, almost everyone is wounded.\u00a0 All the officers and NCOs who you recognized as part of your chain of command are either wounded or dead.\u00a0 You\u2019ve probably got frostbite, very little actual training, and you\u2019re probably scared as hell.\u00a0 You\u2019ve still got several miles to go to get to Hararu-ri where the Marine perimeter is, and officers are trying to organize units to attack this Chinese held hill in the dark.<\/p>\n<p>That is the situation that faced the task force in the early morning hours of 2<sup>nd<\/sup> December.\u00a0 Majors were leading squads in desperate, uncoordinated attacks on the Chinese positions.\u00a0 Many of the troops, completely leaderless just kept going after they took the hill, wandering on the ice until they got to the Marine positions.<\/p>\n<p>During the chaos, LTC Faith was wounded by a grenade sending shrapnel into his chest, and leaving the truck column leaderless.\u00a0 They managed to make it another 2 miles, before the column was finally over run and destroyed by the Chinese.\u00a0 Perhaps the most tragic part of this, is that the columns final destruction came within spitting distance of the 31<sup>st<\/sup> rear CP positions which had been pulled out just one day before.\u00a0 For his courage, LTC Faith, who didn\u2019t survive the battle, was awarded the Medal of Honor, as well as 10 other Soldiers receiving the Distinguished Service Cross.<\/p>\n<p>We\u2019ll never know exactly how many troops were attached to RCT 31.\u00a0 Any unit rosters that might have existed are gone, but some have guessed anywhere from 2,000-3,000 troops were on the east side of Chosin.\u00a0 About 1,500 of these troops made it to friendly lines.\u00a0 Most with wounds so severe that they had to be evacuated.\u00a0 Only 385 able bodied troops remained, who were formed into the informal 31\/7, and assigned to 7<sup>th<\/sup> Marines for the fighting retreat to Hungnam harbor.\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rangerup.com\/peaceold.html\"><img decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"alignright size-medium wp-image-13605\" src=\"http:\/\/www.rhinoden.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/12\/peaceold-2-300x300.jpg\" alt=\"peaceold-2\" width=\"300\" height=\"300\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Task force Faith\u00a0 has gone down in history, unfairly, as a group of cowards that did poorly and their fate was the ultimate result of poor leadership and soldiering.\u00a0 It is only now, 65 years later, that we\u2019ve begun to reexamine this doomed force.<\/p>\n<p>It is one of those haunting \u201cwhat if\u2019s\u201d that refuse to go away.\u00a0 There are so many things that could have been done to save the formation.\u00a0 Had serious effort been made to evacuate the wounded at the inlet perimeter, instead of the 4 that were removed, the truck column might not have been needed.\u00a0 Had the task force been properly supplied with ammo, or had 2\/31 ever actually arrived maybe they would have fared better.\u00a0 Finally, had the 31<sup>st<\/sup> rear CP and 31<sup>st<\/sup> tank company not been pulled out the day before the breakout, it is almost certain the formation might\u2019ve been saved, the final destruction coming within eyesight of the village the CP had been.<\/p>\n<p>Every Marine has a right to take pride in the accomplishments of the 1<sup>st<\/sup> Marine Division during the Chosin campaign.\u00a0 RCT 31, by comparison, is often lost, over looked or dismissed because of its eventual fate.\u00a0 It\u2019s important to note, that for 4 days and 5 nights, task force Faith managed to tie down the better part of two Chinese divisions\u00a0 (the 80<sup>th<\/sup> and 81<sup>st<\/sup>), and kill as many as 4,000 Chinese troops.\u00a0 This may have been the key to the Marines holding Hagaru-ri long enough to consolidate and construct the airstrip.<\/p>\n<p>When all hope was lost, these soldiers pushed themselves to the limit of their endurance and fought on against the inevitable.\u00a0 We should remember such bravery in the face of overwhelming odds.\u00a0 We should honor the courage these men showed, and finally, we should make every effort to return them home, once and for all.<\/p>\n<p>Read the Original Article at <strong><a href=\"http:\/\/rhinoden.rangerup.com\/the-forgotten-task-force-of-the-forgotten-war\/\">RhinoDen<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The Korean War has often been referred to as the forgotten war.\u00a0 Sandwiched between WWII and Vietnam the Korean War is often lost in our histories and remembrances.\u00a0 There is very little in this war that is \u201csexy\u201d for historians.\u00a0 In the end the final lines end pretty much where they started and nothing was&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_is_tweetstorm":false,"jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","enabled":false}}},"categories":[475,1286,1898],"tags":[3444,3445,2772,3446,3447,3448],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10173"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10173"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10173\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10173"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=10173"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10173"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}