{"id":10104,"date":"2016-01-18T17:41:22","date_gmt":"2016-01-18T23:41:22","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/hcstx.org\/?p=10104"},"modified":"2016-01-18T17:41:22","modified_gmt":"2016-01-18T23:41:22","slug":"examining-the-future-of-ground-naval-and-air-combat","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/2016\/01\/18\/examining-the-future-of-ground-naval-and-air-combat\/","title":{"rendered":"Examining the Future of Ground, Naval and Air Combat"},"content":{"rendered":"

The following are three articles from the Cipher Brief I collated into one big article for the convenience of reading it in one sitting. These are good, relevant and succinct articles with little fluff.-SF<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

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\"green\"<\/p>\n

Ground Warfare<\/strong><\/p>\n

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After the United States emerged from the Vietnam War, it witnessed the events of the 1973 Yom Kippur War\u2014a state-level conflict fought against Israel by a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria. That war underscored how far potential enemies had advanced in terms of weapons and tactics. The U.S. Army responded with a renewed focus on major combat operations, which entailed a combination of doctrine, training, and new weapon systems.<\/p>\n

Those changes produced an efficient and lethal ground combat force, as Operation Desert Storm and initial combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom showed. But the focus was on state-level conflict. As such, these operations did not prepare the Army for the full spectrum of operations it has been called on to support.<\/p>\n

In the future, the United States may face three types of adversaries\u2014irregular, state-sponsored hybrid, and state adversaries. Non-state irregular forces typically are not well trained, have little formal discipline, and operate in small formations about the size of squads.<\/p>\n

Middle adversaries are essentially state-sponsored hybrid forces characterized by capabilities on both ends of the spectrum. Thus, they have the same sorts of weapons that irregular forces have, but they have additional capabilities, such as anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and man-portable air defense weapons (MANPADs), and longer-range, larger-caliber rockets.<\/p>\n

High-end adversaries are the forces of a nation state. They are hierarchically organized, ranging from battalion to brigade and larger formations. Their weapons span the spectrum of sophisticated weaponry, including air defenses, ballistic missiles, conventional ground and special operations forces, air and naval forces and, in some cases, nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n

The U.S. military, particularly the Army, has been deeply engaged for over a decade in the irregular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and has made significant adaptations to these types of adversaries. During the same time, Russia and China have been developing military capabilities designed to overmatch the United States and, particularly, to present challenges to U.S. forces attempting to project power into spaces they consider their privileged domains. While the United States may not fight Russia or China directly as state adversaries, it will surely face their military capabilities in the future, particularly among state-sponsored hybrid adversaries.<\/p>\n

Such is already the case in state-sponsored hybrid operations in ongoing conflicts in the Ukraine, Syria, and Iraq. The Ukrainian conflict reflects a closer interaction between a state (Russia) and its proxy (Ukrainian Separatists), and the use of weaponry that the United States has not confronted since the Cold War in theory, and in practice, since the Vietnam War. In Syria, the Syrian rebels are asking for MANPADS to deal with Syrian and Russian air power. The Islamic State also has significant military capabilities, mainly captured from the Syrians and Iraqis, including tanks, a variety of MANPADS and ATGMs, artillery, anti-aircraft guns, and multiple rocket launchers.<\/p>\n

All of this suggests the Army needs to pay attention to adversaries in the \u201cmiddle\u201d\u2014that is, state-sponsored irregular forces. Such groups represent the type of adversary U.S. ground forces are likely to face. Also, capabilities that work against mid-tier adversaries buy the nation a decent start toward dealing with the high-end adversary, who will also use ATGMs and the like, in large numbers. The number of state-sponsored irregular forces is growing, and they employ a strategy focused on causing large numbers of casualties over an extended period of time\u2014one that Western nations find most difficult to counter. In a sense, the United States is facing a situation like it faced after the 1973 war in Israel, except this time, state-sponsored hybrid actors\u2014as well as state actors\u2014are big challenges.<\/p>\n

Read the Original Article at the Cipher Brief<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

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\"naval\"<\/p>\n

Naval Warfare<\/strong><\/p>\n

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The Cipher Brief:\u00a0 How has the use of naval power changed since the end of the Cold War?\u00a0 What adjustments has the U.S. Navy undergone to adapt to these changes?\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

Thomas Mahnken:\u00a0 <\/strong>Surface ships, submarines, and naval aircraft represent large capital investments that are designed to see service for decades.\u00a0 It should, therefore, not be surprising that many of the world\u2019s navies, including the U.S. Navy, still bear the heavy imprint of the Cold War.\u00a0 That is less true of rapidly modernizing navies, such as the Chinese People\u2019s Liberation Army Navy, a large portion of which was launched after the end of the Cold War.<\/p>\n

One major change relating to naval power that has become increasingly prominent since the end of the Cold War, is the growth and spread of so-called anti-access\/area denial (A2\/AD) capabilities, which are aimed at blunting the ability of navies to operate close to shore and, increasingly, farther out to sea.\u00a0 The spread of precision-guided munitions, sensors, and command and control capabilities has rendered aircraft (including naval aircraft) and surface ships increasingly vulnerable.\u00a0 As a result, submarines are playing, and will continue to play, an increasingly prominent role in sea power.<\/p>\n

The U.S. Navy is still addressing the tactical, operational, and strategic implications of its forces becoming increasingly vulnerable due to the increasing A2\/AD capabilities among its adversaries.\u00a0 It is exploring ways to defend against anti-access\/area denial threats, as well as operational concepts to negate those threats.<\/p>\n

TCB: What have been the most significant technological developments or innovations in naval power since the Cold War ended?<\/strong><\/p>\n

TM:\u00a0 <\/strong>There are several.\u00a0 One of the most prominent has been the growth of unmanned systems, both in the form of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), but also unmanned surface vehicles (USV) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs).\u00a0 In coming years, we will see unmanned systems performing a growing range of missions, such as reconnaissance and targeting.<\/p>\n

Other innovations that may bear fruit are sea-based laser weapons for air and missile defense, and electromagnetic rail guns.\u00a0 The former, if it proves to be feasible, could transform the balance between missiles and missile defense. \u00a0The latter could do so as well but also could magnify the ability of naval forces to strike targets ashore.<\/p>\n

TCB: What external and internal\u00a0factors\u00a0(i.e. rising powers, budgetary shifts,\u00a0new leadership, etc.)\u00a0have driven these changes in technology and use of naval power?<\/strong><\/p>\n

TM:\u00a0 <\/strong>Changes in the Navy have been driven both by internal and external factors.\u00a0 The Navy has faced constrained budgets, first during the post-Cold War drawdown, then during the Bush Administration\u2019s buildup to fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and now still in a period of budget cutbacks.\u00a0 It has sought ways to field larger numbers of less-capable ships, such as the Littoral Combat Ship, as a way of maintaining fleet size in an era of austerity.<\/p>\n

In recent years, foreign military developments have increasingly driven naval technology, particularly as China acquires a more capable military and as Russia has become more assertive.\u00a0 Whereas the United States has been focused on waging counterinsurgency campaigns in the Middle East, China has been focused on increasing its maritime and air power.\u00a0 Russia remains a world-leader in missile technology, including sea-launched cruise missiles, as Moscow\u2019s recent employment of sea- and submarine-launched land-attack cruise missiles against targets in Syria demonstrates.<\/p>\n

TCB: Many presidential candidates are concerned that the naval fleet has shrunk over the years and indicate the U.S. needs a larger navy, with at least one suggesting 600 ships. Is that a false premise since warfare and ship capabilities have changed dramatically? \u00a0You mentioned the Navy has purchased less capable ships because of budget constraints. \u00a0What are they lacking?<\/strong><\/p>\n

TM:<\/strong> Both quantity and quality matter in naval warfare, in the 21st<\/sup> century as in the past.\u00a0 The size of the fleet matters, because demonstrating presence, deterring aggression, and reassuring allies are key naval missions and ships can only be in one place at a time.<\/p>\n

But quality also matters: presence, deterrence, and reassurance rest on the foundation of credible combat power.\u00a0 Ships, like the Littoral Combat Ship, were designed to be relatively inexpensive, but this has come at the expense of credible combat power, and that ultimately undermines their effectiveness in deterring aggressors and reassuring allies.<\/p>\n

TCB: How is the Navy working with the private sector to develop new technology to face future threats?<\/strong><\/p>\n

TM:\u00a0 <\/strong>I imagine that as long as the Navy faces highly constrained budgets, it will be asking more of private industry in terms of developing new technologies. It is likely that the Defense Department overall will seek more ideas from industry but will also expect industry to put up more of the up-front costs in developing them.<\/p>\n

TCB:\u00a0 How do you see the role of the Navy changing?<\/strong><\/p>\n

TM:\u00a0 <\/strong>The Navy has not fought a war at sea against a major adversary since 1945, and has not faced a capable competitor since the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War.\u00a0 The character of war is changing, and China is rapidly becoming a capable competitor. Both have considerable implications for the Navy: what it buys, the concepts it develops, and how it educates and trains its sailors.<\/p>\n

All in all, the Navy faces an exciting and challenging period.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Read the Original Article at The Cipher Brief<\/a><\/strong><\/div>\n
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\"air\"<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
Air Warfare<\/strong><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Three dramatic developments have occurred in the employment of U.S. air power in the past 25 years: the vulnerability of air defenses faced, leading to far less attrition of U.S. aircraft than was suffered previously; the ability to strike ground targets with great precision, day or night; and the ability to observe, track and target ground forces nearly continuously.\u00a0 Each is complementary to the others, and together, they allow American air power to dominate the battlefield to a degree not approached before.\u00a0 The enhanced capabilities reflect technological advances, limited capabilities of the adversaries faced, as well as adaptations by U.S. air forces that took advantage of the opportunities presented by these conditions.\u00a0\u00a0 It is important to emphasize that these were conditions, since trends can change and new conditions can well present new dangers.<\/p>\n

Attacks on the Iraqi air defense system at the opening of the 1991 Gulf War exposed the vulnerability of air defenses to the integrated employment of several technologies: laser-guided bombs, anti-radiation missiles, and stealth aircraft, only the last of which was really new.\u00a0 The United States had used laser-guided bombs and anti-radiation missiles extensively in the war in Vietnam 20 years prior, but their employment put the attacking aircraft in great danger, making their use problematic in highly contested airspace.\u00a0 Laser\u2013guided bombs on stealth aircraft presented an entirely new and effective attack mode. The stealth F-177s destroyed the Iraqi air defense system, making the radar missile sites vulnerable to the anti-radiation missiles.\u00a0 As a result, these sites restricted their use of radar except for short periods, and when the severely outmatched Iraqi Air Force elected not to fly in opposition to the Coalition air attacks, the skies virtually belonged to the Coalition air forces.<\/p>\n

These conditions occurred again over Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999.\u00a0\u00a0 Both Serbs and Iraqis recognized their best option was keeping air defense systems and aircraft protected for another day, or another war.\u00a0 Over Afghanistan since 2001 and Iraq since 2003, U.S. air power faced negligible air defense threats.\u00a0 Aircraft have remained vulnerable to heat-seeking missiles and anti-aircraft artillery when flying at low altitudes, but aircraft at 15 thousand feet and above have attained protected positions for conducting bombing or reconnaissance missions.<\/p>\n

With medium altitudes protected against air defense systems in the Gulf War, precision bombing with laser guidance extended to the use by non-stealthy aircraft and against a wide range of targets, including aircraft on the ground, in and out of aircraft shelters, tanks, and other targets that required pin-point accuracy (precise to within several meters) to be effective.\u00a0 The only defenses became smoke or clouds that obscured the targets, as laser-guidance could not penetrate them\u2014a significant drawback to their use.<\/p>\n

Within ten years, U.S. weapon development removed that limitation through the development of the Global Positioning System (GPS) attachments (known as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guidance kits) to what had been free-fall bombs.\u00a0 These weapons homed in on the GPS target coordinates with no post-launch guidance required.\u00a0 First employed in the 1999 war over Kosovo and with accuracy similar to laser-guided bombs, both fighter aircraft as well as bombers (B-52, B-1 and B-2) employed JDAMS extensively in this and in all subsequent air campaigns.\u00a0 With communication systems that tied aircraft together with ground units that could identify ground targets, JDAMs employment allowed an air\/ground attack system heretofore regarded as ideal but not practical because of multiple limitations.<\/p>\n

The third development, a dramatically enhanced reconnaissance capability, became a crucial factor in the 1991 Gulf War and has continued to improve since.\u00a0 \u00a0Two new technologies that made their appearance in the 1991 Gulf War served as the vehicles for change: the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft and the Pioneer unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).\u00a0 The JSTARS aircraft provided a wide-ranging view of the ground environment much as radars have provided for years a similar capability of airborne aircraft.\u00a0 The Pioneer, a short range tactical reconnaissance platform used by the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, complemented JSTARS for close-in views of the battlefield.\u00a0 Quickly building on the success of the Pioneer, the more widely known Air Force Predator UAV took part in the war over Bosnia in 1995, and Predator came to be part of a veritable constellation of UAVs\u2014Reaper, Global Hawk, Shadow, Raven\u2014that have become operational since.\u00a0 With long loiter time and full motion video of the ground, UAVs add perhaps the most important element of reconnaissance for ground forces. \u00a0Both JSTARS aircraft and UAVs can send a common view of ground actions and targets to ground force and command posts, allowing immediate reaction to the situations observed.\u00a0 And, just as inevitably as reconnaissance aircraft in World War I began to carry bombs and guns, in short order, UAVs added missiles along with cameras, turning reconnaissance platforms into targeting and strike aircraft as well.<\/p>\n

Technology alone has not brought these advances in operational capability of air forces.\u00a0 An effective organization had to tie together and integrate reconnaissance, strike, and air superiority elements of air power.\u00a0 That organization became a joint and combined air operations center, known by its familiar name, the CAOC (Combined Air and Space Operations Center).\u00a0 Growing from Air Force-only operation centers, the CAOC had its most direct antecedent in the Gulf War and has served as the heart of planning and conducting air campaigns since.\u00a0 The Center, housed in a single building with all service elements representatives present, brings a coherent and more total application of air power that previously possible.<\/p>\n

With the number of advances described, one may have the temptation to see the dominance of American air power as an automatic U.S. advantage\u2014as a right, not as a conditional situation that requires constant adaptation.\u00a0 To the degree that perception exists, recall that U.S. experience since the end of the Cold War has faced opponents with air defenses that either were quickly neutralized or were opponents that had no air defense or significant air forces of their own.\u00a0 Looking forward, the Air Force needs to anticipate less favorable contingencies, ones that could involve losses of bases or operations centers or in situations with far less permissive airspace in which to operate.\u00a0 Those contingencies would require hardened bases, more stealth, and longer-range air systems, all taking part in a contested airspace environment.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

\u00a0Read the Original Article at The Cipher Brief<\/a><\/strong><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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The following are three articles from the Cipher Brief I collated into one big article for the convenience of reading it in one sitting. These are good, relevant and succinct articles with little fluff.-SF   Ground Warfare   After the United States emerged from the Vietnam War, it witnessed the events of the 1973 Yom…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_is_tweetstorm":false,"jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","enabled":false}}},"categories":[2280,1583,1704,475,1286,1189,1894,17,65,1898],"tags":[3605,2277,1450,3783],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10104"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10104"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10104\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10104"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=10104"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thetacticalhermit.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10104"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}